在人类纪阅读马克思和海德格尔：自动化社会中的心灵的功能

本文选自“当代激进思想家译丛”之《南京课程》

贝尔纳·斯蒂格勒 著

张福公 译

南京大学出版社2019年

本书简介

本书是对法国著名技术哲学家贝尔纳·斯蒂格勒于2016年在南京大学哲学系开设的短期研究生课程“在人类纪时代阅读马克思和恩格斯——从《德意志意识形态》到《自然辩证法》”的八篇课程讲义的汇编。

在本书中，斯蒂格勒致力于借助现象学、后现象学、人类学、热力学、生物学等所提供的问题域和思想资源，从技术哲学的角度重新激活胡塞尔、海德格尔、德里达、西蒙栋等一批重要思想家的理论生长点，重新阐释马克思和恩格斯的经典文本和哲学精髓，以深入剖析自资本主义工业革命以来的人类纪时代中人的历史性生存所遭遇的诸多问题，特别是以数字第三持存为载体的自动化社会中以无产阶级化、系统性愚昧为表征的人类生存困境，并积极探索一种通过依托现代技术的药理学双面性来逃离人类纪、走向负人类纪的替代性方案和可能。透过本书，我们可以管窥斯蒂格勒在当代数字化资本主义批判中所做的种种理论努力，捕捉到他当下正在从事的激进社会批判理论的基本线索。

关于作者

贝尔纳·斯蒂格勒（1952-2020），当代法国著名技术哲学家，解构主义大师德里达的得意门生。1992年在德里达的指导下于法国社会科学高等研究院获博士学位。他的技术哲学思想继承了马克思主义特别是法兰克福学派的社会批判理论传统，广泛吸收了胡塞尔和海德格尔的现象学、西蒙栋和吉尔的技术哲学、德里达的解构主义、勒鲁瓦-古兰和梅林·唐纳德的人类学以及现代自然科学等诸多思想资源，建构了一种独特的直面当代数字化资本主义社会现实的激进批判话语，这使他成为当代西方社会批判理论阵营中最重要的代表人物之一。

其主要代表作有：《技术与时间》（1994-2001）、《象征的贫困》（2004-2005）、《怀疑和失信》（2004-2006）、《构成欧洲》（2005）、《新政治经济学批判》（2009）等。

随着通过利用1993年左右开始出现的网络技术所搭建的全球性网络而实现的交互阅读和书写的出现，数字化技术已经推动超级工业社会进入无产阶级化的新阶段。在这个新阶段中，超级工业时代进入一个系统性愚昧的时代。

With the advent of reticular reading and writing, via globally accessible networks that use those web technologies that began to be implemented around 1993, digital technologies have led hyper-industrial societies towards a new stage of proletarianization. In this new stage, the hyper-industrial age turned into an era of systemic stupidity.

利用远程—作用（和远程—客体性）所织成的网络，生产中心被去地域化，巨大市场被塑造出来，并被远程控制，工业资本主义和金融资本主义被结构性地分离开来，电子金融市场被连续地相互联系起来，实时指挥着数学应用于“金融业”所产生的自动主义。这样一来，自动决策过程就功能性地与基于驱力的自动主义联系在一起，这种自动主义控制着消费者市场——最初是通过大众传媒的中介，今天则是通过踪迹工业，亦即数据经济（即个人数据经济）的中介而实现的。

Across networks of tele-action (and tele-objectivity), production centres can be de-localized, huge markets can be formed, and then remotely controlled, industrial capitalism and financial capitalism can be structurally separated, electronic financial markets can be continuously interconnected, directing in real time the automatisms that are derived from the application of mathematics to the “finance industry.” Processes of automated decision making can then be functionally tied to the drive-based automatisms that control consumer markets—initially through the mediation of the mass media, and, today, through the industry of traces that is also known as the data economy (that is, the economy of personal data).

数字化自动装置已经成功绕过心灵的协商功能，系统性愚昧已经在消费者和投机商之间由驱力功能性地建构起来，使两者相互对立——这已经超出了马茨·阿尔维森和安德烈·斯派塞所说的“功能性愚昧”。

Digital automata have succeeded in bypassing the deliberative functions of the mind, and a systemic stupidity has been established between consumers and speculators, functionally based in the drives, and pitting each against the other this goes well beyond what Mats Alvesson and André Spicer have called “functional stupidity”.

马茨·阿尔维森（1956-）：瑞典隆德大学经济管理学院教授，以批判管理学研究见长。其代表作有：《愚昧悖论：工作中功能性愚昧的力量与陷阱》（2016）、《批判性管理研究》（2000）等

安德烈·斯派塞：伦敦城市大学卡斯商学院组织行为学教授，主要从事商业伦理、组织文化、批判管理学等研究。其代表作有：《愚昧悖论：工作中功能性愚昧的力量与陷阱》（2016）等

然而，最近几年，尤其是2008年之后，普遍性麻木状态似乎已经伴随着系统性愚昧、功能性愚昧而出现了。

In the last few years, however, and specifically after 2008, a state of generalized stupefaction seems to have arisen that accompanies this systemic bêtise, this functional stupidity.

这种正在发生的呆滞是由最近一系列的技术休克引起的，这种技术休克开始于1993年的数字化转向，即利用网络——不只是因特网——而引起的数字化转向。这些休克及其主要特点与结果的披露已经产生一种近乎真实的震惊状态——特别是面对“天启四骑士”（谷歌、苹果公司、脸书和亚马逊），它们看起来正在瓦解那些自启蒙以来的工业社会。

The resulting stupor is caused by the most recent series of technological shocks that emerged from the digital turn of 1993, that is, with the web—and not only with the internet. The revelation of these shocks, and of their major features and consequences, has brought about a state that is almost literally that of being stunned—in particular in the face of the “four horsemen of the Apocalypse” (Google, Apple, Facebook and Amazon), and who appear literally to be disintegrating those industrial societies that emerged from the Aufklärung.

其中一个结果就是，在巴黎“精神技术工业政治国际联合会”的一次公众会议上，那些相信或信奉数字时代的承诺的人们（包括我自己和我在联合会的朋友们）都遭遇了我们所说的“网络蓝调”。

One result has been what, at a public meeting of Ars Industrialis in Paris, we have referred to as “net blues”, suffered by those who had believed or do believe in the promises of the digital era (including my friends at Ars Industrialis and myself).

斯蒂格勒使用“网络蓝调（net blues, le blues du Net）”这一概念是为了指认在数字化时代中网络技术的药理学特质。斯蒂格勒指出，过去二十多年里，数字化革命已经利用网络技术对人类生活的各个方面实现了普遍形式化，这在极大改变人们的生活方式和思想观念的同时，也隐藏着巨大的潜在威胁。尤其是2013年爆出的“斯诺登事件”，彻底暴露了网络巨头和黑客分子对私人数据和个人隐私的安全威胁，人们的一切网络行为都被置于赤裸状态，从而引发了人们对网络技术本身的忧虑和质疑。而这正是斯蒂格勒意在表明的网络技术在药理学意义上的毒性效应。对于这一概念的具体阐释，请参见斯蒂格勒于2013年9月所做的专题讲座实录：http: //reseaux. blog. lemonde. fr/2013/09/29/blues-net-ber-nard-stiegler/（法文版）和 http: //www.  samkinsley. com/2013/11/21/bernard-stiegler-the-net-blues/（英文版）

从工业民主的崩溃中产生的超级工业社会构成了彻底无产阶级化的第三个阶段：我们看到了19世纪的技能知识的丧失，20世纪的生活知识的丧失。在21世纪，我们见证了这个理论知识丧失的时代的诞生——似乎令我们震惊的原因是处在一种绝对难以想象的发展中的。

The hyper-industrial societies that have grown out of the ruins of the industrial democracies constitute the third stage of completed proletarianization: in the nineteenth century, we saw the loss of savoir-faire, and the loss of savoir-vivre in the twentieth. In the twenty-first century, we are witnessing the dawn of the age of the loss of savoirs théoriques, of theoretical knowledge—as if the cause of our being stunned was an absolutely unthinkable development.

随着数字化技术使总体自动化得以可能，那些作为最卓越的观念化和认同的成果的理论都过时了——同时，科学的方法本身也过时了。这至少是克里斯·安德森在《理论的终结：数据洪流淘汰科学方法》一书中告诉我们的。

With the total automatization made possible by digital technology, theories, those most sublime fruits of idealization and identification, are deemed obsolete—and along with them, scientific method itself. So at least we are told by Chris Anderson, in The End of Theory: The Data Deluge Makes the Scientific Method Obsolete.

克里斯·安德森（1961-），作家、企业家、美国《连线》杂志总编辑，曾任职于《自然》《科学》《经济学家》等著名刊物。其代表作有：《长尾理论》（2006）、《免费》（2009）、《创客：新工业革命》（2012）等

建立在数字踪迹的自主—自动生产之上的、由使用这些踪迹的自动主义所主导的超级工业社会正在经历理论知识的无产阶级化，就像电视的广播模拟踪迹导致生活知识的无产阶级化，就像工人身体向机械踪迹的屈服导致技能知识的无产阶级化。

Founded on the self-and-auto-production of digital traces, and dominated by automatisms that exploit these traces, hyper-industrial societies are undergoing the proletarianization of theoretical knowledge, just as broadcasting analogue traces via television resulted in the proletarianization of savoir-vivre, and just as the submission of the body of the labourer to mechanical traces inscribed in machines resulted in the proletarianization of savoir-faire.

就像苏格拉底在文字踪迹中已经看到了无产阶级化的威胁，任何知识的外化都将带来这一结果——而明显矛盾的是知识的建构恰恰依赖于知识的外化——这样，数字的、模拟的和机械的踪迹就是我所说的第三持存。以后我将解释这些术语。

Just like the written traces in which Socrates already saw the threat of proletarianization that any exteriorisation of knowledge brings with it—the apparent paradox being that the constitution of knowledge depends on the exteriorisation of knowledge—so too digital, analogue and mechanical traces are what I call tertiary retentions, and I will explain later these terms.

当德勒兹指认他所说的“控制社会”时，他就已经预告了超级工业时代的到来。对注意力和欲望的破坏性捕获就在德勒兹根据20世纪末电视对消费者的非强制性调节所描述的控制社会中，并通过这种控制社会发生着。这些控制社会出现在消费主义时代晚期，它们要做的就是设法向超级工业社会时代过渡。

When Gilles Deleuze referred to what he called “control societies,” he was already heralding the arrival of the hyper-industrial age. The destructive capture of attention and desire is what occurs in and through those control societies that Deleuze described in terms of the non-coercive modulation exercised by television on consumers at the end of the twentieth century. These societies of control appear at the end of the consumerist epoch, and what they do is to make way for the transition to the hyper-industrial epoch.

德勒兹还没有意识到自动社会，但他和瓜塔里预言了它（特别是当他们指认了分割体的时候）。在自动社会中，控制就是对洞察力的机械性清算，从希腊语判断到krinon——krinein这一动词与决断，有着相同的词根。洞察力，即康德所说的知性已经被自动化，且被自动化为依托于算法的分析权力。算法是通过传感器和执行器来传递形式化指令的，而这都是在康德意义上的任何直觉、任何经验（这是克里斯·安德森所讨论的情境）之外的。

In the automated society of which Deleuze could hardly have been aware, but which he and Félix Guattari anticipated (in particular when they referred to dividuals) , control undertakes the mechanical liquidation of discernment, from the Greek to krinon—from krinein, a verb that has the same root as krisis, decision. Discernment, which Kant called understanding (Verstand), has been automated and automatized as analytical power that has been delegated to algorithms, algorithms that convey formalized instructions through sensors and actuators but outside of any intuition in the Kantian sense, that is, outside of any experience (this being the situation that occupies Chris Anderson).

2008年崩溃以后的八年里，人们仍然不知道如何最恰当地界定这个事件：危机，突变，蜕变？所有这些术语都是隐喻——它们仍然缺乏真正的思考。

Eight years after the collapse of 2008, it is still not clear how best to characterize this event: crisis, mutation, metamorphosis? All these terms are metaphors—they still fall short of actual thinking.

危机有着悠久的历史——在希波克拉底那里，它是指疾病过程中的一个关键性的转折点——它也是一切批判、一切决断，即根据标准做出判断的权力的起源。

Krisis, which has a long history—in Hippocrates it refers to a decisive turning point in the course of an illness—is also the origin of all critique, of all decision exercised by to krinon as the power to judge on the basis of critera.

突变在今天主要是从生物学的意义上来理解的——即使在法语中，“切除”在日常生活的意义上也是指被从一个位置转移到另一个位置。

Mutation is understood today primarily in relation to biology—even if, in French, to be “mute” generally refers in everyday life to being transferred to another posting.

蜕变是一个动物学术语，它来自希腊语，由奥维德引介而来。

Metamorphosis is a zoological term that comes from the Greek—by way of Ovid.

奥维德（前43-前17），罗马诗人，与贺拉斯、卡图卢斯和维吉尔齐名。代表作《变形记》《爱的艺术》《爱情三论》等

2008年崩溃后的七年里，似乎心灵的无产阶级化，更准确地说，理论化的智力能力的无产阶级阶级化，在科学的、伦理的、审美的和政治的协商意义上——它与20世纪的感性和情感的无产阶级化，与19世纪的工人姿态的无产阶级化是一致的——既是这种持续的“危机”的诱因，又是它的结果。结果，我们没有做任何决断，也没有抵达任何转折点或德勒兹所说的“分叉点”，即我们后面将会看到的一种负熵事件。然而，蕴含在这场危机源头中的一切有害方面都继续被强化了。

Seven years after this event, it seems that the proletarianization of minds, and more precisely, the proletarianization of the noetic faculties of theorization and in this sense of scientific, moral, aesthetic and political deliberation—combined with the proletarianization of sensibility and affect in the twentieth century, and with the proletarianization of the gestures of the worker in the nineteenth century—is both the trigger for and the result of this continuing “crisis.” As a result, no decisions are taken, nor do we arrive at any turning point, any “bifurcation” for speaking with Deleuze’s words, that is a negentropic event as we will see later. Whereas, all of the toxic aspects that lie at the origins of this crisis continue to be consolidated.

当原因亦即结果的时候，我们发现自己处在一种螺旋之中。这种螺旋可能是卓有成效而值得的，也可能把我们封闭在——缺乏新的标准——恶性循环之中，我们将其描述为一种“向下螺旋”，一种“更坏的螺旋”，它将我们推向更糟糕的境地。

When a triggering factor is also an outcome, we find ourselves in a spiral. This spiral can be very fruitful and worthwhile, or it can enclose us—absent new criteria—in a vicious circle that we describe as a “downward spiral”, a “spirale du pire”, that takes us from bad to worse.

我们已将2008年危机停留在后幼虫状态，这意味着我们应该将其看作一种蜕变（而不是突变：这里所说的不是生物学上的突变，即使生物学是通过生物技术、在某些方面是以准—无产阶级化的方式得以进行的）。这并不意味着没有危机，或者我们不需要考虑它所呼吁的批判性劳动。也就是说，这种批判性劳动恰恰是这种蜕变似乎不可能提供的东西，也正是由于这样的事实，因此蜕变首先在于理论知识即批判性知识的无产阶级化。正是出于这个原因，我认为要基于这种关于蛹的比喻来理解这次危机的持久本质。

The post-larval state in which we have left the crisis of 2008 means we should refer to it in terms of metamorphosis (rather than mutation, what is going on here is not biological, even if biology comes into play via biotechnology, and, in certain respects, in a quasi-proletarianized way). This does not mean that there is no krisis, or that we need not take account of the critical labour for which it calls. It means that THIS CRITICAL LABOUR IS PRECISELY WHAT THIS METAMORPHOSIS SEEMS TO RENDER IMPOSSIBLE, thanks precisely to the fact that it consists above all in the proletarianization of theoretical knowledge, which is critical knowledge. It is for this reason that I propose understanding the enduring nature of this crisis on the basis of the metaphor of the chrysalis.

当下自动社会实践的混沌状态建构了一种新的精神语境（即麻木呆滞），在这种语境下，系统性愚昧无疑是激增了（功能性愚昧、以驱力为基础的资本主义和工业平民主义），但这也可以从一种新角度——如果它没有转变为恐慌，而是变为一种丰富的怀疑，就有可能产生对这种状况的新的理解的开始——和新标准或范畴的开端来看待这一现象：这就是我所说的范畴发明问题。而且，这也是对分叉点问题的新的理解问题，即把人类纪中的负熵活动理解为一种熵纪的问题。

The stupefying situation in which the current experience of automatic society consists establishes a new mental context (stupefaction) within which systemic stupidity undoubtedly proliferates (as functional stupidity, drive-based capitalism, and industrial populism), but which can also be viewed in relation to a NEW CONCERN—which, if it is not turned into panic, and instead becomes a fertile skepsis, could turn out to be the beginning of a new understanding of the situation—and the genesis of new criteria, or categories: this is the question of what I call categorial invention. And it is also the question of new apprehension of the questions of bifurcation, that is of negentropic events into the Anthropocene apprehend as an entropocene.

这种新的理解或智慧将会颠倒药的毒性逻辑，从而产生一个新的超级工业时代，这个时代建构了一个基于去无产阶级化，即负熵之上的自动社会——它将提供一条从智性昆虫的蛹中蜕变出来的出路——而这一路径是基于（阿玛蒂亚·桑意义上的）积极的外部性和能力的增殖,即基于一种捐赠性的传粉经济之上。

ENTROPOCENE

This new understanding or intelligence would be that which, inverting the toxic logic of the pharmakon, would give rise to a new hyper-industrial age constituting an automatic society founded on de-proletarianization, that is, on negentropy—and which would provide an exit from the chrysalis of noetic hymenoptera—based on the valorisation of positive externalities and capacities (in Amartya Sen’s sense), that is, on a contributive economy of pollination.

法文维基百科对膜翅目昆虫的词条解释是：“膜翅目昆虫包括食草动物、传粉昆虫以及种类繁多的食虫性昆虫，后者在维系自然平衡中起到主要作用。食虫性昆虫占了拟寄生昆虫的大多数（占膜翅目昆虫的43%），也是食肉动物。据估算，膜翅目昆虫大约有100万到300万种，分为100个科。很多种类的膜翅目昆虫还尚未被研究或发现。”

French Wikipedia entry on hymenoptera: “The order hymenoptera includes herbivores, pollinators, and a wide range of entomophagous insects that play a central role in maintaining natural equilibrium. The entomophagous insects comprise the majority of parasitoids (43% of hymenoptera species that have been described) but also predators. The actual number of hymenoptera is estimated at somewhere between one and three million species, divided into a hundred families. Many species have not yet been described, or even discovered.”

工作姿势的无产阶级化发展为工人的屈—在状况的无产阶级化。

一切都受条件限制的感情、感性生活和社会关系的无产阶级化发展为市民的外—在状况的无产阶级化。

心灵或精神的无产阶级化，即能够进行理论化和慎思的智力能力的无产阶级化，是科学共—存（包括各种人文社会科学）条件的无产阶级化。

The proletarianization of the gestures of work amounts to the proletarianization of the conditions of the worker's subsistence.

Sub-sistence

The proletarianization of sensibility, of sensory life, and the proletarianization of social relations, all of which being replaced by conditioning, amounts to the proletarianization of the conditions of the citizen’s ex-sistence.

Sub-sistence

Ex-sistence

The proletarianization of minds or spirits, that is, of the noetic faculties enabling theorization and deliberation, is the proletarianization of the conditions of scientific consistence (including the human and social sciences).

Sub-sistence

Ex-sistence

Con-sistence

在超级工业时代，超级控制是通过普遍的自动化过程建立的。因此，它代表着超越德勒兹所发现和分析的调节控制的一步。现在，这种理论化和慎思的智力能力因当前的无产阶级化主导因素而短路了，这种无产阶级化即数字第三持存，或记忆技术制品——正如模拟第三持存是导致20世纪生活知识的无产阶级化的主导因素，机械第三持存是导致19世纪技能知识的无产阶级化的主导因素。

In the hyper-industrial stage, hyper-control is established through a process of generalized automatization. It thus represents a step beyond the control-through-modulation discovered and analyzed by Deleuze. Now, the noetic faculties of theorization and deliberation are short-circuited by the current operator of proletarianization, which is digital tertiary retention, or mnemotechnical artefact—just as analogue tertiary retention was in the twentieth century the operator of the proletarianization of savoir-vivre, and just as mechanical tertiary retention was in the nineteenth century the operator of the proletarianization of savoir-faire.

通过对一种记忆要素和时间要素进行物质的、空间的复制而人为地保存某物，第三持存就改变了胡塞尔所指认的作为原生持存的心理知觉持存和作为第二持存的心理记忆持存之间的关系。

By artificially retaining something through the material and spatial copying of a mnesic and temporal element, tertiary retention modifies the relations between the psychic retentions of perception that Husserl referred to asprimary retentions, and the psychic retentions of memory that he called secondary retentions.

所谓的“理性”，更一般地说，所谓的思考就是一种注意形式。注意本身是一种在胡塞尔所说的持存（R，记忆）和前摄（P，期望）之间运行的安排，这种安排需要借助技术持存即记忆存储器的中介，我称之为第三持存（当然，除了他的《几何学起源》之外，胡塞尔没有表达这样的观点）：字母文字，比如数字化文字，就是一种第三持存。构造思路的注意形式是持存和前摄之间的各种安排，而这又是借助记忆存储器式的记忆形式而成为可能的。

What is called “reason”, and more generally, what is called thinking is a form of attention, and that attention is itself an arrangement operating between what Husserl referred to as retentions (R, memories) and protentions (P, expectations), via the intermediary of technical retentions, that is, mnemotechnics, which I call tertiary retentions (this is not Husserl’s views of course, except in his Origin of geometry): alphabetical writing, like digital writing, is a type of tertiary retention. Attentional forms, which constitute ways of thinking, are arrangements of retentions and protentions made possible by mnemotechnical forms of memorization.

A=R3 (R/P)

一切形式的思考都是一种胡塞尔所说的原生持存、第二持存和前摄的时间结构。一种时间之流，比如你在听一场演讲，而实际上，你在这个瞬间所听到的东西，只能以这种方式建构它自身，因为它是一种胡塞尔所说的许多原生持存的聚合。现在，我正在给你们上课，你好像在听，你以“原生[持存]”的方式保存下每一个被发出的要素。“原生”在这里意味着每一个在每一瞬间中展现自身的要素都将会汇聚到紧随其后的下一瞬间的要素中，并被保留在这一要素中。由此，它就形成时间之流中的“现在”——因此，许多音素聚合成一个词，许多词聚合成一个句子，许多句子聚合成一个段落，如此等等——这样，一个意义统一体就形成了。这些一个接一个积累起来的集合就形成了胡塞尔所说的原生持存。

Thinking, in all its forms, is a temporal fabric of what Husserl called primary and secondary retentions and protentions. A temporal flux or flow, such as a speech that you might listen to, as in fact you are doing at this very moment, can only constitute itself as such because it is an aggregation of what Husserl called primary retentions. In the course of this speech that I am delivering before you, and that you seem to be listening to, you retain in a “primary” way each of the elements that are presented. “Primary” here means that each element that presents itself in each instant aggregates itself to the element that follows it in the next instant, and is retained in it, with which it forms the “now” of the temporal flow—hence phonemes that aggregate to form a word, words that aggregate to form a sentence, sentences that aggregate to form a paragraph, and so on—so that a unity of meaning is formed. These aggregations that accumulate one upon the other form what Husserl called primary retentions.

然而，这些原生持存就是诸多选择：它们只是根据持存的标准而被保留下来，而这些标准是在我之前的经验过程中形成的。准确地说，我的经验是一种第二持存的积累，而第二持存又是先前的、转瞬即逝的原生持存，并构成我的记忆的材料。

These primary retentions are, however, selections—they are retained only on the basis of retentional criteria, criteria that are formed in the course of my prior experience. And my experience is, precisely, an accumulation of secondary retentions, which are former primary retentions that subsequently become past, and which constitute the stuff of my memory.