在人类纪阅读马克思：

从《德意志意识形态》到《资本论》

Reading Marx in the Anthropocene: 

From the German Ideology to Das Kapital

本文选自“当代激进思想家译丛”之《南京课程》

贝尔纳·斯蒂格勒 著

张福公 译

南京大学出版社2019年

本书简介

Introduction

本书是对法国著名技术哲学家贝尔纳·斯蒂格勒于2016年在南京大学哲学系开设的短期研究生课程“在人类纪时代阅读马克思和恩格斯——从《德意志意识形态》到《自然辩证法》”的八篇课程讲义的汇编。

在本书中，斯蒂格勒致力于借助现象学、后现象学、人类学、热力学、生物学等所提供的问题域和思想资源，从技术哲学的角度重新激活胡塞尔、海德格尔、德里达、西蒙栋等一批重要思想家的理论生长点，重新阐释马克思和恩格斯的经典文本和哲学精髓，以深入剖析自资本主义工业革命以来的人类纪时代中人的历史性生存所遭遇的诸多问题，特别是以数字第三持存为载体的自动化社会中以无产阶级化、系统性愚昧为表征的人类生存困境，并积极探索一种通过依托现代技术的药理学双面性来逃离人类纪、走向负人类纪的替代性方案和可能。透过本书，我们可以管窥斯蒂格勒在当代数字化资本主义批判中所做的种种理论努力，捕捉到他当下正在从事的激进社会批判理论的基本线索。

关于作者

Bernard Stiegler

贝尔纳·斯蒂格勒（1952-2020），当代法国著名技术哲学家，解构主义大师德里达的得意门生。1992年在德里达的指导下于法国社会科学高等研究院获博士学位。他的技术哲学思想继承了马克思主义特别是法兰克福学派的社会批判理论传统，广泛吸收了胡塞尔和海德格尔的现象学、西蒙栋和吉尔的技术哲学、德里达的解构主义、勒鲁瓦-古兰和梅林·唐纳德的人类学以及现代自然科学等诸多思想资源，建构了一种独特的直面当代数字化资本主义社会现实的激进批判话语，这使他成为当代西方社会批判理论阵营中最重要的代表人物之一。

其主要代表作有：《技术与时间》（1994-2001）、《象征的贫困》（2004-2005）、《怀疑和失信》（2004-2006）、《构成欧洲》（2005）、《新政治经济学批判》（2009）等。

上周，我已经设法向你们说明了马克思是为什么和如何误读了著名的主—奴辩证法，以及为什么这个奴隶不再是奴隶：因为他是一个雇工，即一个仆人。

Last week I tried to show you why and how Marx misinterpreted the famous dialectic of the master and the slave, and why this one is not a slave; since he is a knecht, that is, a servant.

另一个问题则涉及这样一个事实，即马克思没有对技术的含糊地位提出质疑，也没有将技术看作一种药——这也是为什么马克思主义往往被看作一种决定论的原因之一。

Another question is the fact that Marx doesn’t question the ambiguous status of technology as it is a pharmakon—and this is one of the reasons for which Marxism is so often considered to be a determinism.

我原本想在今天给你们阐述一下现在处于人类纪的资本主义的系统性界限。但由于我们的时间有限，而且你们已经有了说明这一问题的文本，因此我更乐意让你们自己去阅读它。所以，我将通过尝试性地对《大纲》做些评论来结束这次研讨课程。

l wanted to show you today what are the systemic limits of capitalism today as Anthropocene, but we don’t have time and since you have the text which addresses this question, I prefer to let you read it. So I will finish this seminar by proposing comments of the Grundrisse.

由于既没有提出药的毒性问题，也没有提出药的治愈性问题及其预想的治疗方法（它始终是一种去无产阶级化的体系），因此，马克思主义的否定辩证法产生了无产阶级专政的学说，而不是一种去无产阶级化的政治方案，即在市民的个体化中重新获得知识。

By failing to pose either the question of the toxicity of the pharmakon, or that of its curativity and the therapeutic this presupposes (which is always a system of de-proletarianization), the Marxist negative dialectic leads to the doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and not to a political project of de-proletarianization, that is, to a reacquisition of knowledge in the service of the individuation of citizens.

这种结果不是因为马克思错了，而是因为哲学是一种集体事业。人们只能为其所处时代的个体化做出贡献——因为他们的时代变成了每个人的时代。

This outcome was due not to Marx being wrong, but because philosophy is collective work, and those who contribute to its individuation are able to do so only in their time—and as their time becomes the time of everyone.

马克思，当然做不到考虑所有时代，也无法再更改他自己的思想。因为这些概念对他来说还是难以获得的，因为外化本身还没有达到一个需要思考编程化的阶段（比如，在第三持存形式中时间的药理学的空间化），所以，马克思没能提出治疗的药理学即积极的药理学的问题。

Marx, of course, could not conceive all this and the way that it could and should come to modify his own concepts. Because these concepts were unavailable to him, and because exteriorisation itself had not yet reached the stage that would require thinking grammatization as such (as the pharmacological spatialization of time in the form of tertiary retention), Marx was not able to pose the question of a curative pharmacology, that is, a positive pharmacology.

后结构主义在这一问题上的失败似乎主要在于它忽视了马克思主义的技术理解视域，尽管科斯塔斯·亚克色罗斯曾做过分析。但对马克思来说，他还没有能够将这种治疗设想为一种可以重建知识或者反对无产阶级化的技术的和工业的个体化。

The failure of post-structuralism to pose this question seems to lie, rather, more in the fact that it ignores the scope of the Marxist understanding of technics, despite the analyses of Kostas Axelos. But for Marx, he would not have been in a position to envisage this curativity as technological and industrial individuation, reconstituting knowledge and participating in the struggle against proletarianization.

科斯塔斯·亚克色罗斯（1924-2010）：希腊-法国哲学家，西方马克思主义理论家，自称开放的马克思主义者。曾是希腊共产党员（1941-1945），后被驱逐出党，于1945年流亡法国。其代表作有：《马克思思想中的异化、实践和技术》（1976）等

显然，构成马克思主义之基础的工作和工人的辩证法，在黑格尔那里，并不是工人变成无产者的情况，而是工匠变为企业家即资产者的情况。换句话说，马克思主义对这种辩证法的挪用是基于一种误解之上的。

This dialectic of work and workers, which is obviously the foundation of Marxism, in Hegel describes less the situation of the worker becoming proletarian than that of the artisan becoming an entrepreneur, that is, bourgeois. In other words, the reappropriation of this dialectic by Marxism is based on a misunderstanding.

而黑格尔没有思考的东西——在他对绝对精神通过工作并在工作中的生成即“概念运作”一个阶段的分析中——是机器的工作，它剥夺了工人的独特性和工作，工作变成了职业（工资），这种否定性将工人变为纯粹的劳动力，这种劳动不再是工作，因为正如黑格尔所说的，工作是一种个体化过程，在这个过程中，工人同时被个体化为对象，即在技术上将自身个体化（这就是我试图描述的在一种联合的环境中的工作）。

What Hegel nevertheless does not think here—where he analyses the becoming of objective spirit by and in work, and as a stage of the “work of the concept”—is the machine's work, which deprives the worker of his singularity, that is, of his work, which becomes a job (a salary), a negativity that turns it into a pure force of labour that is no longer work properly speaking, given that work, as Hegel explains here, is an individuation process in which the worker is individuated at the same time as the object, which thus individuates itself technically (this is what I have tried to describe as work in an associated milieu).

就马克思主义的经济—政治理论的本质将会导致基于这个辩证法假设上的无产阶级专政来说，这就是为什么说它是建立在一种深刻的误读基础之上的原因。因为马克思自己在《大纲》中就表明，在机器中由外化所执行的规则，作为编程化，就是结构性地、物质性地剥夺奴隶的所有知识的东西——这就变成了奴隶，即工人、雇佣劳动者，这种身份注定会通过雇佣劳动的方式被扩展到“所有阶层的人们”，正如马克思和恩格斯在《共产党宣言》①中所写的那样。

This is why, inasmuch as the essence of Marxist economico-political theory will turn out to be a dictatorship of the proletariat supposedly grounded in this dialectic, it is based on a profound misinterpretation. For Marx himself showed in the Grundrisse that the determination carried out by exteriorisation in machines, and as grammatization, is what structurally and materially deprives the slave of all knowledge—the slave who becomes the worker, the wage labourer, a status destined to be extended to “all layers of the population” via wage labour, as Marx and Engels write in the Communist Manifesto.

在《资本论》中，马克思一方面使无产阶级概念与工人阶级概念具有相同含义，另一方面将无产阶级状况的否定性看作一种无法超越的界限，从来没有提出去无产阶级化的问题或假设，即一种延续了黑格尔式的形而上学的马克思主义倾向。

In Das Kapital, Marx's gesture consists, on the one hand, in making the concept of the proletariat synonymous with the concept of the working class, and, on the other hand, in taking the negativity of the proletarian condition as an unsur passable horizon and in never posing the question or the hypothesis of de-proletarianization—a Marxist leaning that prolongs Hegelian metaphysics.

现在，我们知道，提供免费软件的工作组织是建立在去无产阶级化基础之上的，而去无产阶级化本身是基于贡献性之上的，这种贡献性是随着网络尤其是网站——比如维基百科——而使贡献性技术而成为可能的。

Now, we know that free software organization of work, for example, is based on de-proletarianization, itself being based on the controbutivity made possible by the contributive technologies that appeared with the net and especially the web, for example, Wikipedia.

换言之，马克思哲学在这一点上没有能够预见技术的进化，即作为数字第三持存的技术进化。

In other words, Marxian philosophy is not capable here to anticipate the evolution of technology as it is the one of digital tertiary retention.

黑格尔没有考虑到的是，技术会使工人的知识发生短路和绕避，因而工人就变为一个奴隶，而不再是一个雇工，不再直接服务于主人，而是直接服务于机器。相反，马克思试图思考机器技术，但是他这样做时并没有对主—奴辩证法做出任何的推进。因为，他“忘记”了思考由外在化过程所构成的器官学的积极和消极的药理学，而是将普遍的历史主体（无产阶级）的否定性变为革命的原则。然而，正是从工作中产生的药理学替补的治疗积极性将非个体化的逻辑颠倒过来，并使其颠倒为自主的技艺，从而必然使个体化即知识的新阶段成为可能。这一定是作为热爱知识（技能知识、生活知识和理论知识）的新历史阶段而展开的。

What Hegel doesn't think is technics as that which bypasses and short-circuits the knowledge of the worker thus becoming a slave, no longer a knecht, no longer serving the master directly, but the machinery. To the contrary, Marx attempts to think machine technology, but he does so without drawing any consequences f or the master knecht dialectic. Because he “forgets” to think the positive and negative pharmacology of the organology that is constituted by the process of exosomatisation, he turns the negativity of the universal subject of history (that would be the proletariat) into the revolutionary principle, whereas it is the curative positivity of the pharmacological supplement deriving from work that inverts the logic of disindividuation, and as technique of the self, and that must make possible a new age of individuation, that is, of knowledge. And it must do so as a new history of the love of knowledge, its savours, as savoir-faire and as savoir-vivre as well as theoretical knowledge.

马克思在《共产党宣言》（1848）中描述了无产阶级化的过程，将其描述由于外化而导致的知识的丧失，这个观点在《大纲》（1857）中被进一步发展了。

Marx described the process of proletarianization in the Communist Manifesto (1848), and he described it as the loss of knowledge resulting from exteriorisation, a viewpoint that would be further developed in the Grundrisse (1857).

《共产党宣言》第一版，1848 年以德文出版

无产阶级不是工人阶级，而是非—工人阶级，即衰落了的、去阶级化了的人所构成的阶级。他们是那些一无所知的、不以知识提供服务的人，因为他们服侍的不是主人，而是服侍把知识外化给“主人”的体系。

The proletariat is not the working class, but the non-working class [la classe des désoeuvres], that is, the downgraded, the class of those who are de-class-ified. They are those who no longer know, but serve without knowledge, because they serve not a master, but systems that exteriorize knowledge EVEN FOR THE “MASTERS”.

当马克思提出外化——知性在本质上就在于外化——首先且最重要的是生产手段即他的“唯物主义”时，对知性的黑格尔式的、“唯心主义”的定义就被马克思所颠倒了。但是，在这种对唯心主义的清算中，马克思忽视了理想问题，即在欲望对象的一切投入和一切知识中运作的理想化。

The Hegelian and “idealist” definition of the understanding was inverted by Marx when he proposed that exteriorisation, in which understanding essentially consists, is first and foremost that of the means of production: such is his “materialism”. But in so dismissing idealism Marx lost sight of the question of ideality, that is, idealization as what is at work in all investment and in all knowledge of the object of desire.

后结构主义也遮蔽了这一问题，并混淆了欲望和驱力：这种关于无产阶级的误解同时也是对欲望的误解。

And poststructuralism, too, leaves this in the shadows, tending as it does to confuse desire and drive: the misunderstanding in relation to the proletariat is at the same time a misunderstanding of desire.

在《德意志意识形态》（1845）中，马克思的唯物主义首先在于确认智性存在运用他们的技术能力所进行的第一个“历史活动”。非—非人存在即，

一旦人开始生产自己的生活资料，即迈出由他们的肉体组织所决定的这一步的时候，人本身就开始把自己和动物区别开来。②

In The German Ideology (1845), Marx’s materialism consists firstly in identifying the first “historical act” of noetic beings with their technical capacity. Non-inhuman beings

begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical organisation.

这样，黑格尔式的外化问题就“重新回到原点”，在某种程度上成为一个一般器官学的问题，这里，唯物辩证法将存在（及其生成）指定为行动，即生产：

他们是什么样的，这同他们的生产是一致的——既和他们生产什么一致，又和他们怎样生产一致。因而，个人是什么样的，这取决于他们进行生产的物质条件。③

The Hegelian question of exteriorisation is thus “put back on its feet”, in some way as a question of general organology, where the materialist dialectic assigns being (and its becoming) to doing, that is, to production.

As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with what they produce and with how they produce. Hence what individuals are depends on the material conditions of their production.

我们已经将存在定义为生产和再生产，即基于人为选择的标准化过程的外在化。

We already saw that this the definition of being as production and re-pro-duction, that is, as exo-somatisation based on a process of artificial selection.

这种能够导致工人的无产阶级化的外化在《大纲》中是根据从工具到机器，即一个外化的新阶段的变迁来加以解释的：

劳动资料经历了各种不同的形态变化，它的最后的形态是机器，或者更确切些说，是自动的机器体系（即机器体系：自动的机器体系不过是最完善、最适当的机器体系形式，只有它才使机器成为体系）……这种自动机是由许多机械器官和智能器官组成的，因此，工人自己只是被当作自动的机器体系的有意识的肢体。

That this exteriorisation can lead to the proletarianization of workers is explained in the Grundrisse in terms of the passage from the tool to the machine, that is, to a new stage of exteriorisation.

The means of labour passes through different metamorphoses, whose culmination is the machine, or rather, an automatic system of machinery (system of machinery: the automatic one is merely its most complete, most adequate form, and alone transforms machinery into a system) […]; this automaton consisting of numerous mechanical and intellectual organs, so that the workers themselves are cast merely as its conscious linkages.

这里，劳动者仍然不是工人，因为一个工人在工作意味着他打开了一个世界，用法语说就是“œuvre”。而那些劳动者已经变成机器的器官，就像一个软件或一匹马，或者一个奴隶，准确地说是一个雇工。

Here, the labourers are not still workers, because a worker works, this meaning, opens a world, in French, œuvre. Those labourers have become themselves organs of this machinery, exactly like a software or a horse or a slave that is not at all, here, precisely, a knecht.

马克思继续说：

机器无论在哪一方面都不表现为单个工人的劳动资料。机器的特征绝不是像[单个工人的]劳动资料那样，在工人的活动作用于[劳动]对象方面起中介作用；相反地，工人的活动表现为：它只是在机器的运转，机器作用于原材料方面起中介作用——看管机器，防止它发生故障，这和对待工具的情形不一样。工人把工具当作器官，通过自己的技能和活动赋予它以灵魂，因此，掌握工具的能力取决于工人的技艺。相反，机器则代替工人而具有技能和力量，它本身就是能工巧匠，它通过在自身中发生作用的力学规律而具有自己的灵魂。⑤

And Marx continues,

In no way does the machine appear as the individual worker’s means of labour. Its distinguishing characteristic is not in the least, as with the means of labour, to transmit the worker’s active that it merely transmits the machine’s work, the machine's action, on to the raw material—supervises it and guards against interruptions. Not as with the instrument, which the worker animates and makes into his organ with his skill and strength, and whose handling therefore depends on his virtuosity. Rather, it is the machine which possesses skill and strength in place of the worker, is itself the virtuoso, with a soul of its own in the mechanical laws acting through it.

这种分析形成了西蒙栋在《技术客体的存在方式》中的观点的基础，他对去个体化过程的描述就是基于对马克思的阐述：

技术个体在某个点上变成了人的对手，竞争者，因为曾经只有工具的人，现在已经集中了所有的技术个体于自身﹔然后，机器取代了人的位置，因为人给了机器关涉工具的功能。⑥

This analysis forms the basis of Simondon’s argument in Du mode d’existence des objets techniques. The process of disindividuation that he describes paraphrases these statements by Marx.

The technical individual becomes at a certain point man's adversary, his competitor, because man had, when there were only tools, centralized all technical individuality within himself; the machine then takes the place of man because man gives to the machine the function of tool-bearer.

吉尔伯特·西蒙栋（1924-1989），法国哲学家，师从乔治·冈圭朗、梅洛·庞蒂，代表作有《技术对象的存在形式》等

马克思确实强调了工业的劳动分工、机器对工人和工具的取代，由此也带来了知识和科学的地位变化。科学知识被置于服务外化过程的位置，由此，知识自身（知识一般）也外化了自身。而这种外化正是新的外在化的制度，后者使我们的时代表现为中断，使社会体系发生短路和绕道——但是，这个结果是自我毁灭的，这里我们就知道我们为什么需要重新解读马克思和恩格斯的哲学，以及重新思考面对数字化经济的政治学是什么。

Marx does indeed emphasize that this industrial division of labour, and the replacement of workers and tools by machines, is also a change in the status of knowledge and of the science that it brings. Scientific knowledge is placed at the service of the process of exteriorisation, whereby knowledge itself, and in general, is that which exteriorizes itself. And this exteriorisation is the new regime of exosomatisation that characterize our times as disruption, that short-circuits and by-passes social systems—but these consequences are self-destructive, and here we can see why we need to reinterpreted Marx and Engels’s philosophy as well as to reconsider what is politics faced with digital economy.

注释

Reference

①Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, p. 88, translation modified. 参见《马克思恩格斯文集》第2卷，人民出版社，2009年版，第38-39页。

②参见《马克思恩格斯文集》第1卷，人民出版社，2009年版，第519页。

③参见《马克思恩格斯文集》第1卷，人民出版社，2009年版，第520页。

④Karl Marx, Grundrisse, p.692. 参见《马克思恩格斯全集》第31卷，人民出版社，1998年版，第90页。

⑤Karl Marx, Grundrisse, pp.692-693. 参见《马克思恩格斯全集》第31卷，人民出版社，1998年版，第90-91页。

⑥Gillbert Simondon, Du mode d’existence des objets techniques, p. 15.